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Abstract 
Authenticated key agreement protocols are to authenticate the users who will start a conversation and establish a common session
key. In 2009, Cheng-chi Lee et al. proposed a new authenticated group key agreement based on a novel bilinear pairing to provide
integrity of the transmitted messages. In this paper, we show that Cheng-chi Lee et al.’s protocol can only ensure the validity
between the second step and the third step, and the intermediate message between the first step and the second step can be disturbed 
by attackers. That is, Cheng-chi Lee et al.’s protocol doesn’t achieve their goal.  
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1. Introduction
In the open distributed network environment, authentication and confidentiality are the basic
requirements for communications. Authenticated key agreement protocols are applied to authenticating 
the identities that will start a conversation and establish a common session key in this environment. It 
allows two or multiple parties to share this session key for subsequent data encryption and integrity 
protection. Authenticated group key agreement protocol describes some messages exchanged by a group 
of users in order that each user can recognize the others’ identities and make an agreement on their 
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common session key with them. Many authenticated key agreement protocols have been proposed to 
achieve this aim. 
In 1976, W. Diffie first proposed a two-party key agreement protocol [8]. For lack of authentication, 
this protocol can’t resist the man in the middle attack. In 1982, Ingemaresson et al. [9] first extended the 
two-party Diffie–Hellman key agreement protocol [8] to the group key distribution protocol. Afterward, 
many secure group key agreement protocols [11] [12] offered various levels of complexity. In 1998, 
Chang and Wu [5] proposed a group-oriented authentication mechanism with key exchange. However, 
Hung-Yu Chien et al. [6] pointed out that their protocol is vulnerable to the impersonation attack. In 
2000, Asokan et al. [1] proposed a group key agreement protocol for a cluster of mobile nodes with little 
or no support infrastructure. However, their protocol is only suited for a small group of powerful devices. 
In 2004, K.Y. Choi et al. [7] proposed two group key agreement schemes from bilinear pairings: one is a 
bilinear variant of Burmester and Desmedt scheme [3] and the other is an ID-based authenticated scheme 
based on the former. However, Fangguo Zhang [15] et al.’s impersonation attack shows their protocol can 
not provide authenticity. In 2005, Burmester and Desmedt [4] proposed a secure and scalable group key 
exchange protocol based on the Diffie–Hellman protocol. 
In 2005, Nam et al. [13] proposed a group key agreement in a mobile environment, which is based on 
the decisional Diffie–Hellman assumption [2].However, Tseng [14] showed that the protocol of Nam et 
al. is also not a contributory group key agreement protocol because the participants cannot confirm that 
their contributions were involved in establishing the group key. Then, He proposed a new group key 
agreement protocol for an imbalanced network and demonstrated that the proposed protocol is a 
contributory group key agreement protocol and is provably secure against passive attacks under the 
decisional Diffie–Hellman assumption. 
In 2009, Cheng-chi Lee et al. found that Tseng’s protocol was a nonauthenticated protocol and could 
not ensure the validity of the transmitted messages. Then they proposed a new authenticated group key 
agreement [10] based on a novel bilinear pairing. 
In this paper, we show that Cheng-chi Lee et al.’s protocol can only ensure the validity between the 
second step and the third step, and the intermediate message between the first step and the second step 
can be disturbed by attackers. Then we discuss the flaws in their first verification and come to conclusion 
that the attackers can affect the finally common key In the BR security model.  
2. Preliminaries 
2.1. Bilinear pairing 
Let P denote a generator of , where is an additive group of large order q and let be a 
multiplicative group with| | | . A bilinear pairing is a map which has the following 
properties: 
1G
2G
1G 2G
1 |G = 1 1:e G G G× →
1. Bilinearity: for all , .( , ) ( , )abe aP bQ e P Q= 1,P Q G∈ , qa b Z∈
2. Non-degenerative: There exists such that .
1,P Q G∈ ( , ) 1e P Q ≠
2.2.  Computational problems 
Let
1G and be two groups of prime order q, let be a bilinear pairing and let P be a 
generator of
1G .
2G 1 1:e G G G× →
y Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) 
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1,P Q G∈ , to find a number *qn Z∈ , where q is a prime order of group 1G , such 
that P nQ= whenever such n exists. 
y Bilinear Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem (BCDHP) 
Given for *, qa b Z∈ , compute bP  or given for *, qa b Z∈ , distinguish 
, , and ( ), , R , where 1
( ) 1, ,P aP abP G∈
( )bP aP abP
( ) 1, ,P aP abP G∈
aP abP R G∈ is random. 
3. Review of Cheng-chi Lee et al.’s protocol 
The abbreviations and notations used in Cheng-chi Lee et al.’s protocol are as follows: 
p is a prime number, q is the order of the elliptic curve, 
1G is a cyclic additive group of order q,  is a 
cyclic multiplicative group of order q, P is a public point, is a random number, where , n 
is the number of participants involved in generating a common conference key, stands for the 
participants, ( , is the powerful node with less restriction, is the mobile devices 
with limited computing capability, and H is a map-to-point hash function .
2G
( )i n≤ ≤*Zia ∈ q
q
1
iU
) nU1 i n≤ ≤ 1 2 1, , , nU U U −K
*:{0,1H G→ 1}
Lee et al.’s authenticated protocol requires two rounds to construct a group key. Let *
iX Z∈  and 
 be ’s long-term private key and long-term public key. The detailed steps are performed as 
follows: 
( )i iY X P= iU
Round 1: First, each selects a random number  and then computes and
iU (1 i n≤ ≤ ) q*ia Z∈ 1ia− i iA a P=
nU
.
Then, each can generate the signature . Each sends ( to the powerful node . Note 
that ,
iU
i
i iS X A= i )iU , , iSi iU A
1
ia
− A and may be precomputed to reduce the computational cost. Thus, each node may 
precompute (  off-line and store them on its own memory card. 
iS
1, ,i i
− ),ia a A Si
Round 2: After receiving each ( ) , verifies the equation . If it is 
correct, can ensure that are sent by . then selects a random 
number and then computes
, ,i i iU A S
( ), ,i i iU A S
i n
(1 i n≤ ≤ −
(1 i n≤ ≤ −
i
)1 nU
)1
?
( , ) ( , )i ie S P e A Y= i
q
nU
na ∈
iU nU
*Z x a A= . Then, computes nU 1 2 1, , , )n n( ,B H U= x x x −K
1
1( , )
n
n i i
 and .
Next, can compute the common group key 
n nS X B=
nU K e a P x
−
=
= ∑ . Finally, 
broadcasts ( )  to other nodes. nU 1 2 1, , , ,nU x x x −K , Sn n
Round 3: After receiving the broadcast, each
jU (1 j n≤ ≤ − )1 computes 1 2 1( , , , , )n nB H U x x x −= K  and 
verifies the equation . If it is correct, each 
?
( , ) ( , )ne S P e B Y= n jU  can ensure that ( )are sent 
by . Then, each
1 2 1, , , ,n nU x x x −K
nU jU ( )1 1j n≤ ≤ − can compute the common group key: 
2
1 2 1( )1 1
1 1 2 1( , ) ( , ( ) ) ( , ) n n
a a a an
j j i i n n nK e x a x e a P a a a a P e P P −
+ + +− −
= −
= = + + + =∑ LL
4. Cryptanalysis of Lee et al.’s authenticated protocol 
Comparing to Tseng’s non-authenticated protocol, the authenticated protocol adds two elements and 
two verification functions. 
The first element is , which is to make a signature of 
iS iA on Round 1. The verification function 
 on Round 2 is to verify whether ( is sent by or not.  ?( , ) ( , )i ie S P e A Y= i ), ,i i iU A S iU
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n n
i n
The second element is , which is to make a signature of ( on Round 2. The 
verification function e S  on the Step 3 is to verify whether ( )  is sent by .
nS
?
)n P e=
1 2 1, , , ,nU x x x −K
1 2, , , ,nU x x x −K( , ( , )B Y 1 nU
In the authors’ view, if both two functions and hold, each user 
?
( , ) ( , )i ie S P e A Y=
?
( , ) ( , )ne S P e B Y= jU
can authenticate others and compute the session key: (1 j n≤ ≤ − )1
i n
2
1 2 1( )1 1
1 1 2 1( , ) ( , ( ) ) ( , ) n n
a a a an
j j i i n n nK e x a x e a P a a a a P e P P −
+ + +− −
= −
= = + + + =∑ LL .
But if we review the two verification functions and  carefully, we can 
find there are large differences between the two functions.  
?
( , ) ( , )i ie S P e A Y=
?
( , ) ( , )ne S P e B Y=
In the first function, 
iA is a received parameter probably from . If an attacker 
modifies and
iU
iS iA synchronously, such as, intercepting , selecting a random number ,
computing
( , ,i i iU A S ) ' *i qa Z∈
'
i
'
i iA a A=
' ', , iS
iU
, and sending to , the powerful node can not verify 
whether is from or not only by because that the function
holds as well. Finally, the session key is not as the authors designed, but is impacted by the attacker. That 
is to say, Cheng-chi Lee’s improvement to Tseng’s protocol doesn’t achieve their original goal. In the BR 
security model introduced by Bellare, if an attacker sends a reveal query to , she will gain the same 
session key with .in this situation. 
'
iS a=
) iU
'
i iS ( ' ', ,i i iU A S
?
( , )ie S P e=
) nU
( , )i iA Y
nU
( i iU A ' '( ,i ie A Y( , ) )e S P = i
iU
In the second function, B is computed from the equation 
1 2 1( , , , , )n nB H U x x x −= K
i
 but not received from 
the public communication channel. If an attacker wants to change any one of x (1 i n≤ ≤ − )1 , the user jU
will gain a different B from the hash function H. Thus, the second verification function can really 
ensure
ix (1 i n≤ ≤ − )1 is not modified by an attacker. 
Upon the analysis above, we know the first element and its verification function are insecure and the 
second element, meanwhile the second ones are secure. As a result, one possible way to overcome the 
flaws is to change and its verification function in order that any modification to
iS iA can be reflected on the 
verification function. 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper, we show that Cheng-chi Lee et al.’s protocol can only ensure the validity between the 
second step and the third step, and the intermediate message between the first step and the second step 
can be disturbed by attackers. That is, Cheng-chi Lee et al.’s improvement doesn’t achieve their goal. 
Then we discuss the flaws in their first verification to attack their protocol.  
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